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Abstract

Access control can selectively restrict access to sensitive information stored by third-party sites on the
Internet. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes can strengthen the effective combination of flexibility
and operability of access control. They allow one sender to encrypt a message for more than one recipient, and
to specify who should be able to decrypt, using attributes alone. Since 2005, many powerful ABE schemes
have been presented, but there are two types of problem that haven't be efficiently resolved so far. On the one
hand, as practical extension of identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes, ABE schemes are also confronted
with key escrow problem. On the other hand, attribute set belonging to one user is usually monitored by
different authorities in this era of collaboration. Multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE) schemes can simultaneously
resolve these problems, but now they have not been thoroughly investigated yet. More precisely, MA-ABE
schemes against quantum attack are the main barrier of the development of ABE schemes in a 'post-quantum'
world. In this paper, we firstly present a MA-ABE scheme from lattices, in which identities of users are
authenticated by a central authority, which improves the efficiency of authentication. Furthermore, different
attribute private keys are still distributed by different authorities, and the central authority cannot obtain any
secret information of other attribute authorities, which resolves key escrow problem to some extent. In
MAABE, attribute private keys belonging to one user are generated by different authorities, and how to ensure
correct decryption is one of the crux of schemes. Our scheme gives a simple solution, and each user's attribute
private keys are combined using sharing of common public information to automatically realize correct
decryption. To our best knowledge, this is the first MA-ABE scheme from lattices, and it is more efficient than
the MA-ABE presented by Melissa Chase. Finally, we present a multi-authority large universe ABE scheme, in
which the sizes of the public key and the ciphertext are only relative to the number of the attribute authorities,
and a user will be able to decrypt a ciphertext if and only if he has at least tK attributes from each authority K.
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Abstract: Access control can selectively restrict access to sensitive information stored
by third-party sites on the Internet. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes can
strengthen the eﬀective combination of ﬂexibility and operability of access control.
They allow one sender to encrypt a message for more than one recipient, and to specify who should be able to decrypt, using attributes alone. Since 2005, many powerful
ABE schemes have been presented, but there are two types of problem that haven’t
be eﬃciently resolved so far. On the one hand, as practical extension of identity-based
encryption (IBE) schemes, ABE schemes are also confronted with key escrow problem.
On the other hand, attribute set belonging to one user is usually monitored by diﬀerent
authorities in this era of collaboration. Multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE) schemes can
simultaneously resolve these problems, but now they have not been thoroughly investigated yet. More precisely, MA-ABE schemes against quantum attack are the main
barrier of the development of ABE schemes in a ‘post-quantum’ world.
In this paper, we ﬁrstly present a MA-ABE scheme from lattices, in which identities
of users are authenticated by a central authority, which improves the eﬃciency of
authentication. Furthermore, diﬀerent attribute private keys are still distributed by
diﬀerent authorities, and the central authority cannot obtain any secret information of
other attribute authorities, which resolves key escrow problem to some extent. In MAABE, attribute private keys belonging to one user are generated by diﬀerent authorities,
and how to ensure correct decryption is one of the crux of schemes. Our scheme gives
a simple solution, and each user’s attribute private keys are combined using sharing
of common public information to automatically realize correct decryption. To our best
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst MA-ABE scheme from lattices, and it is more eﬃcient than
the MA-ABE presented by Melissa Chase. Finally, we present a multi-authority large
universe ABE scheme, in which the sizes of the public key and the ciphertext are only
relative to the number of the attribute authorities, and a user will be able to decrypt
a ciphertext if and only if he has at least tK attributes from each authority K.
Key Words: LWE, MA-ABE, Lattices, Preimage Sampling Functions.
Category: E.3
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Introduction

Cloud computing paradigm is viewed as a big step to make computation as a
public utility, which provides an opportunity for users, companies, and public
organizations to reduce costs and increase eﬃciencies. Information in local computers is now transferred to cloud platforms, then conﬁdentiality and integrity of
information are becoming more and more important in cloud computing. Access
control is one of the key technologies used for security enforcement of information. An access control model formally speciﬁes how to decide whether an access
request should be allowed or repudiated. There were many schemes to consider
information security in cloud computing [Vleju, M. 14, Rastogi and Solms 12],
but they couldn’t enable eﬃcient one-to-many broadcast encryption and ﬁnegrained access control. In order to make access control more ﬂexible, Sahai, A.
and Waters, B. introduced the concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE)
schemes in 2005 [Sahai and Waters 05], in which a user’s keys and ciphertexts
were labeled with sets of descriptive attributes and a particular key set can decrypt a particular ciphertext only if there is a match between the attributes of
the ciphertext and the user’s keys. After that, ABE attracted much attention as
a relatively new encryption technology.
There were two variants of ABE schemes proposed: key-policy variant (KP-ABE) [Goyal et al. 06] and ciphertext-policy variant (CP-ABE)
[Bethencourt et al. 07]. In the KP-ABE, every ciphertext is associated with a
set of attributes, and each user’s secret keys are associated with a threshold
access structure on attributes. Reversely, in the CP-ABE, attributes are associated with user private keys and access structures with ciphertexts. Many
schemes have been presented: Schemes [Goyal et al. 06, Bethencourt et al. 07,
Ostrovsky et al. 07, Lewko et al. 10, Goyal et al. 08, Attrapadung et al. 11,
Cheung and Newport 07] contributed to make the access structure more expressive. Schemes [Daza et al. 10, Emura et al. 09, Herranz et al. 10] were devoted
to get constant-size ciphertexts. Scheme [Xie et al. 13] proposed construction
with eﬃcient attribute and user revocation.
Similar to identity-based encryption schemes, the attribute authority is able
to compute private key corresponding to any attribute of any user such that he
is free to engage in malicious activities without any risk of being confronted in a
court of law, which is called key escrow problem. There were many cryptosystems
to resolve this problem such as certiﬁcateless cryptosystem, certiﬁcate-based
cryptosystem and multi-authority cryptosystem. Multi-authority cryptosystem
has more extensive application, because the cooperation of diﬀerent departments
often makes it possible for multi-authority to authenticate one common user.
MA-ABE schemes allow the sender to specify for each authority K a set of
attributes monitored by that authority and a number tK so that the message
can be decrypted only by a user who has at least tK of the given attributes
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from each authority K. MA-ABE schemes also allow any number of attribute
authorities to be corrupted, and guarantee the security of encryption as long
as the required attributes cannot be obtained exclusively from those authorities
and the trusted authority remains honest. This is an attractive solution and also
successfully avoids placing trust in a single entity by making the system operate
in a distributed way.
1.1

Related Works

Chase proposed the ﬁrst MA-ABE scheme with a global identiﬁer which combined users’ private keys together to ensure correct decryption [Chase 07], but
the scheme relied on a central authority who knew all the secret keys of any
attribute authority in order to combine all the attribute private keys belonging to the same user. Compared with the scheme [Chase 07], Muller, S. et
al. gave a scheme with a centralized authority that realized any LSSS access
structure [Muller et al. 08], but their proof was limited to non-adaptive queries
only. The scheme achieved roughly the same functionality as the engineering
approach above, except one could still acquire attributes from additional authorities without revisiting the central authority. Chase, M. and Chow, S. gave
a scheme without central authority using a distributed pseudo random function
[Chase and Chow 09]. However, it only supported an AND policy. Lin, H. et al.
[Lin et al. 08] gave a threshold-based scheme that was also somewhat decentralized, in which they must interact during the system setup. Furthermore, the
scheme was only secure up to collusion of m users, where m was a system parameter chosen at setup. Lewko, A. and Waters, B. proposed a new MA-ABE
scheme [Lewko and Waters 11]. In their scheme, any party could simply act as
an authority by creating a public key and issuing private keys to diﬀerent users,
and diﬀerent authorities needed not even be aware of each other.
All the above schemes were based on traditional number theory hard
problems which were proved to have polynomial-time solutions in the environment of quantum computers. In contrast, lattice hardness problems can
resist quantum cryptanalysis and have strong worst-case/average-case security guarantees. Furthermore, the mathematical properties of lattices make
them both relatively eﬃcient and ﬂexible to enable the construction of powerful cryptosystems. So lattices have recently emerged as a powerful mathematical platform on which to build a rich variety of cryptographic primitives. Since the work [Ajtai and Dwork 97], there were many schemes proposed:
one-way functions and collision-resistant hash functions [Ajtai and Dwork 97,
Micciancio 02], public-key encryption schemes [Ajtai and Dwork 97, Regev 05,
Sahai and Waters 05], identity-based encryption schemes [Gentry et al. 08,
Cash et al. 10, Agrawal et al. 10], trapdoor functions [Gentry et al. 08], fully
homomorphic encryption schemes [Gentry 10] and attribute-based encryption
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schemes [Boyen 13, Agrawal et al. 12], but there were no MA-ABE schemes from
lattices yet.
1.2

Our Contributions

In this paper, we ﬁrstly adopt the method in [Chase 07] to give the ﬁrst MAABE scheme from lattices, and also introduce a multi-authority large universe
ABE scheme whose public key and the ciphertext are independently with the
size of attribute universe.
– Our ﬁrst MA-ABE scheme from lattices has many excellent characteristics:
• Our scheme can resolve key escrow problem: It has also a central authority, but the central authority doesn’t know any authorities’ secret
keys diﬀerent with scheme [Chase 07], and he cannot be free to engage
in malicious activities. He can only authenticate identities of users and
combine attributes with users to tie users’ private keys together.
• Setup phase has no private interactivity among attribute authorities:
Attribute authorities generate their master public key and secret key
pairs respectively, and they also independently present attribute private
keys to users without any interactivity. Sharing of public information
combines all the attribute private keys of a user to ensure correct decryption.
• Our scheme keeps the characteristic of ABE: During encryption, the
global identiﬁer of user is not be used such that decryptors can correctly
recover plaintext only using attributes alone.
• Our scheme can resist collusion attack of users: By using of preimage
sampling functions, the images of diﬀerent users’ attribute private keys
cannot be recovered into useful information, and CA combines the attribute sets with the identities of users by using sharing of public information.
• Our scheme ensures backward security and forward security: When attributes or attribute authorities need to be updated, attribute authorities
can reshare the public information to generate and distribute attribute
private keys of users again.
– We also give a MA-IBE scheme with large attribute universe, in which our
generation of attribute private keys is a bit diﬀerent from the above scheme.
Each attribute authority can only have one pair of master public key and
master secret key, but it can generate diﬀerent private keys according to
diﬀerent attributes such that the sizes of public key and the ciphertext are
proportional to the total number of attribute authorities.
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Preliminaries and Deﬁnitions
Notation

In the following, we assume that the attribute universe U can be partitioned
into d disjoint sets U1 , U2 , . . . , Ud , where d is the number of authorities. Each
set will be monitored by a diﬀerent authority. There is also one trusted central
authority CA . We let UGID denote the attribute set of user with global identiﬁer
K
and
GID and let UC denote the attribute set combined with a ciphertext. UGID
K
UC are the attribute sets handled by authority K in the attribute sets of the
C
user GID and the ciphertext C respectively. UGID
is the intersection of user’s
attribute set and ciphertext attribute set.
2.2

MA-ABE Scheme

Our deﬁnition and security model of MA-ABE schemes are similar to those in
[Chase 07], but with signiﬁcant diﬀerences from [Chase 07] that we believe more
reasonable. Each attribute authority K is also assigned a tuple (tK , dK ). A
MA-ABE scheme is composed of four algorithms as follows:
Setup. A randomized algorithm run by both central authority CA and attribute authorities. Taking as input security parameters, it outputs system public
key and each attribute authority’s master public key and secret key.
Attribute Private Key Generation. A randomized algorithm run by a
central authority CA and attribute authority K, taking as input the attribute
authority’s secret key, the attribute authority’s tuple (tK , dK ), a user’s global
K
. CA
identiﬁer GID, and a set of attributes in the authority’s domain UGID
combines GID with the attribute set, and gives the result to attribute authority
K (We will assume that the user’s claim of these attributes has been veriﬁed
by CA before this algorithm is run). Attribute authority K outputs attribute
private keys for the user.
Encryption. A randomized algorithm run by a sender. Taking as input a set
of attributes for each authority, a message, and the system public key, it outputs
the ciphertext.
Decryption. A deterministic algorithm run by a user with global identiﬁer GID. Taking as input a ciphertext, which was encrypted under attribute
set UC and decryption keys for an attribute set UK . Output a message m, if
 C
K
|UGID
UGID | ≥ tK satisﬁes for K = 1, 2, . . . , d.
2.3

Security Model of Multi-Authority ABE System

Let λ be the security parameter. Consider the following game:
Setup
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– The adversary sends a list of attribute sets UC = UC1 , . . . , UCd , one for each
authority. He must also provide a list of corrupted authorities which cannot
include the central authority.
– The challenger generates parameters for the system and sends them to the
adversary. These mean the system public key, master public keys for all
honest authorities, and secret keys for all corrupt authorities.
Secret Key Queries
The adversary can make as many secret key queries as he wants to attribute
authorities. The only requirement is that for each GID, there must be at least
one honest authority from which the adversary requests fewer than tK of the
attributes given in UCK , i.e. the adversary never requests enough attributes to
decrypt the challenge ciphertext.
Challenge
The challenger chooses a message b ∈ {0, 1}, computes the ciphertext of b
for attribute set UC , and sends this ciphertext to the adversary.
More Secret Key Queries
The adversary may make more secret key queries subject to the requirements
described above.
Guess
The adversary outputs a guess b . If b = b , the adversary is said to succeed.
A MA-ABE scheme is selective attributes secure if there is a negligible function ε such that, in the above game, any PPT adversary will succeed with probability at most 1/2 + ε(λ).
2.4 Concrete Trapdoor Functions with Preimage Sampling
[Gentry et al. 08]
Let q = poly(n), m ≥ 5n lg q and L = m1+ε for any ε > 0. The col√
lection is parameterized by some Gaussian parameter s ≥ L.ω( log m),
and trapdoor functions with preimage sampling are described as (TrapGen, SampleDom, SamplePre).
– TrapGen. The function generator uses the algorithm from Ajt99 algorithm
to choose (A, T ), where A ∈ Zqn×m is statistically close to uniform and
T ⊂ Λ⊥ (A) is a good basis with T  ≤ L. The matrix A (and q) deﬁnes the
function fA (.), and the good basis T is its trapdoor.
– SampleDom. The function fA (.) is deﬁned as fA (e) = Ae mod q, with do√
main Dn = {e ∈ Z m : e ≤ s m} and range Rn = Zqn . The input distribution is DZ m , s , which can be sampled using discrete Gaussian probability
distribution scheme with the standard basis for Z m .
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– SamplePre. The trapdoor inversion algorithm SampleISIS(A, T, s, u) samples from fA−1 (u) as follows: ﬁrst, choose via linear algebra an arbitrary
t ∈ Z m such that At = u mod q(such a t exists for all but an at most q −n
fraction of A). Then sample v using SampleD(T, s, −t), and output e = t+v.
2.5 Simple and Eﬃcient “Hash-and-Sign” Digital Signature
Schemes [Gentry et al. 08]
The scheme is built upon a collection of trapdoor functions with Preimage Sampling given by (TrapGen, SampleDom, SamplePre), and operates relative
to a function H = {Hn : {0, 1} → Rn } that is modeled as a random oracle
(recall that Dn and Rn are the domain and range, respectively, of the collection
for security parameter n).
SigKeyGen (1n ). Let (a, t) ← T rapGen(1n ), where a describes a function
fa and t is its trapdoor. The veriﬁcation key is a and the signing key is t.
Sign (t, m). If (m, σm ) is in local storage, output σm . Else, let σm ←
SampleP re(t, H(m)), store (m, σm ), and output σm .
Verify (a, m, σ). If σ ∈ Dn and fa (σ) = H(m), accept. Else, reject.
Proposition. The scheme described above is SUF-CMA-secure in the random oracle model.
2.6

Learning With Errors

The LWE (learning with errors) problem was ﬁrst deﬁned by Regev, O.
[Regev 05], and has been extensively studied and used. We use the decisional
version of the LWE problem.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A prime q, a positive integer n, and a distribution χ over Zq
are all public. A (Zq , n, χ)-problem instance consists of access to an unspeciﬁed
challenge oracle O, being either a noisy pseudo-random sampler Os carrying some
constant random secret key s or a truly random sampler Os , whose behaviors
are respectively as follows:
Os : outputs noisy pseudo-random samples of the form (ωi , υi ) = (ωi , ωiT s +
xi ) ∈ Zqn × Zq , where s ∈ Zqn , is a uniformly distributed persistent secret key
that is invariant across invocations, xi ∈ Zqn is a freshly generated ephemeral
additive noise component with distribution χ and ωi ∈ Zqn is a fresh uniformly
distributed vector revealed as part of the output.
Os : outputs truly random samples (ωi , υi ) ∈ Zqn × Zq , drawn independently
uniformly at random in the entire domain Zqn × Zq .
The (Zq , n, χ)-problem statement allows an unspeciﬁed number of queries
to be made to the challenge oracle O, with no stated prior bound. An algorithm

A decides the (Zq , n, χ)-LWE problem, if |P r[AOs = 1] − P r[AOs = 1]| is nonnegligible for a random s ∈ Zqn .

490

Zhang G., Qin J., Qazi S.: Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption ...

Deﬁnition 2.2. The interactive LWEq problem is described as follows
[Gentry et al. 08]: On input a matrix A ∈ Zqn×m , a vector p ∈ Zqm , a hash
function H : (0, 1)∗ → Zqn , a value z, and access to an oracle, returning a sample from fA−1 (H(z)) (the same value is returned for repeated queries on the same
z). The goal is to distinguish whether p is either a LWE instance or uniform,
i.e., between the case that p = AT s + x for some s ← Zqn , x ← χm , and the case
that p ← Zqm is uniform. When H is modeled as a random oracle, the interactive
LWE problem is hard as long as the standard LWE problem is hard.

3

MA-ABE Scheme from Lattices

In the previous MA-IBE schemes, each authority must authenticate identities of
users which greatly reduces the eﬃciency. In our scheme, there is a central authority CA which is responsible to authenticate users’ identities and to combine
attribute sets with identities of users, which eﬃciently prevents the collusion
of diﬀerent users. The central authority CA must always honestly combine attribute sets with identities of users. Because central authority CA does not know
all secret keys of other authorities, he cannot generate all attribute private keys
on behalf of other attribute authorities. Simultaneously, we adopt the strategy
in [Chase 07] to require that each user has a unique global identiﬁer (GID),
and a user must present his GID to central authority CA in order to receive a
coherent set of keys. However, encryption need not the unique global identiﬁer,
and the ability to decrypt is the same with traditional ABE scheme independent
of the GID.
3.1

Concrete Protocol

Assuming there are d attribute authorities, and each authority K can authenticate dK attributes. CA is a central authority that any authority could be. Let λ
be a security parameter, q = q(λ), p = p(λ) be two primes, n = n(λ), m = m(λ)
be two positive integers, σ = σ(λ), α = α(λ) be two positive Gaussian parameters. tK is the number that a user can only decrypt if he has at least tK of the
given attributes from each authority K. H : (0, 1)∗ → Zq is a hash function.
Let [dK ] ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , dK } denote users’ attribute set that authority K monitors, and |[dK ]| ≥ tK . U denotes attribute universe. For simplicity, we can take
the ﬁrst |U | elements of Zp to be the universe. Namely, integers 1, 2, . . . , |U |.
SetUp. Given a security parameter λ and n, m, σ, α, q as inputs, each authority K runs Ajt99’s lattice trapdoor generation algorithm dK times to get
i
i
i
= AiK ∈ Zqn×m , mskK
= TK
∈ Λ⊥
mpkK
q , (i = 1, 2, . . . , dK ), as master public key and master secret key of authority K. Each authority randomly chooses
a vector uK ∈ Zqn , and CA computes random vector u ∈ Zqn = u1 + u2 +
. . . + uK (mod q) = (u1 , u2 , . . . , un ). CA chooses a family of (d − 1)-degree
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polynomial sets F = {fi = (fi1 , fi2 , . . . , fin ) : {0, 1}l → Zqn } such that for
i = 1, 2, . . . , d, fi1 (0) = u1 , fi2 (0) = u2 , . . . , fin (0) = un . Deﬁne system public
key as M P K = mpk11 , mpk12 , . . . , mpk1d1 , . . . , mpkd1 , mpkd2 , . . . , mpkddd , u, F .
Attribute Private Key Generation. Given user’s identity GID, the central authority CA computes j = H(GID) and uses it as index to choose (d − 1)degree polynomial set fj = (fj1 , fj2 , . . . , fjn ) from the family of (d − 1)-degree
polynomial set F . CA computers d sharing of u to d authorities. More precisely,
he sets (ur, 1 , ur, 2 , . . . , ur, d ) = (fjr (1), fjr (2), . . . , fjr (d)) as sharing of ur for
r = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each authority K gets his share uK = (u1, K , u2, K , . . . , un, K )
and divides it into dK sharing uK1 , uK2 , . . . , uKdK by using (tK , dK ) Shamir
secret sharing scheme on every coordinate of uK , K = 1, . . . , d, and he runs
the algorithm SamplePre to ﬁnd eKi such that AiK eKi = uKi , i ∈ [dK ] and
sends eKi , i ∈ [dK ] to user with identity GID. The user’s private key is
SKGID = (eKi )i∈[dK ] , K = 1, . . . , d.
Encrypt. Given system public key M P K, the attribute set UC1 , . . . , UCd and
a message b ∈ {0, 1}:
d

– Let D = (d!l!)2 , where l = max dK , choose a uniformly random s ← Zqn , a
K=1

K
noise term x ← χα, q and xK, j ← χm
α, q , j ∈ UC , K = 1, 2, . . . , d.

– Compute
c ← uT s + Dx + b q/2 ∈ Zq ,
cK, j ← (AjK )T s + DxK, j ∈ Zqm , j ∈ UCK , K = 1, 2, . . . , d.
– Output ciphertext CT = (c, {cK, j }, j ∈ UCK , K = 1, 2, . . . , d).
Decrypt. Given system public key M P K, the user’s private key SKGID ,
 C
K
UGID | ≥ tK , then the entity does:
and a ciphertext CT . If ∀K, |UGID
– Computes Lagrangian coeﬃcients LK, j , LK so that


LK, j AjK eKj = uK (mod q),

j∈[dK ]

d


LK uK = u (mod q).

K=1

– Computes
b ← c −

d

K=1

LK



LK, j eTKj cK, j (mod q).

j∈[dK ]

– Outputs 0 if b is closer to 0 than to q/2 mod q, otherwise outputs 1.
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3.2

Correctness and Parameter Declaration

Firstly, we note that
d


c−

LK

d


d


d




(LK, j AjK eKj )T s+LK, j (eKj )T DxK, j )mod q

j∈[dK ]

LK(



d


d


K=1
d


= uT s + b q/2 + Dx − uT s −

LK

LK, j (eKj )T DxK, j mod q

j∈[dK ]



LK, j (eKj )T DxK, j mod q

j∈[dK ]

K=1



LK



LK

K=1

= b q/2 + (Dx −

LK, j (eKj )T DxK, j )mod q

j∈[dK ]

(LK uK )T s −

d




(LK, j uKj )T s+

j∈[dK ]

K=1

= uT s + b q/2 + Dx −

LK, j ((eKj )T (AjK )T s + DxK, j ) mod q

j∈[dK ]

LK(

K=1

= uT s+b q/2 +Dx−



LK

K=1

= uT s+b q/2 +Dx−

LK, j (eKj )T cK, j (mod q)

j∈[dK ]

K=1

= uT s+b q/2 +Dx−



LK, j (eKj )T DxK, j mod q.

j∈[dK ]

K=1

In order to ensure the correctness, we should require that
|Dx −

d


LK

K=1



LK, j (eKj )T DxK, j | ≤ q/4.

j∈[dK ]
d

Because D = (d!l!)2 , where l = max{dK },
K=1

d

K=1

LK



LK, j (eKj )T DxK, j =

j∈[dK ]

d


(d!)2 LK

K=1



((l!)2 LK, j (eKj )T xK, j ).

j∈[dK ]

Especially, LK (d!)2 and LK, j (l!)2 are all integers.
Furthermore,
|Dx −

d

K=1

LK


j∈[dK ]

LK, j (eKj )T DxK, j |
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≤ D|x| + |

d




LK

K=1
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LK, j (eKj )T DxK, j |.

j∈[dK ]

≤ D|x| + |(d!)2 (l!)2

d



xK, j |.

K=1 j∈[dK ]

So we can pick the noise vectors appropriately so that
|Dx −

d

K=1

3.3

LK



LK, j (eKj )T DxK, j | ≤ q/4.

j∈[dK ]

System Update

Here, we discuss system update caused by the update of attributes and attribute
authorities. In our scheme, each authority needn’t to regenerate his master public key and secret key during system update, and they only distribute part of
attribute private keys again.
– If there is an attribute withdrawn from attribute universe U , and we assume
that attribute authority κ who monitors this attribute. Authority κ needn’t
to reset his setup phase, and he can delete the public key corresponding
to this attribute and share his uκ to (uκ, 1 , uκ, 2 , . . . , uκ, dκ −1 ) again. Then
he generates the other attribute private keys according to the new sharing
and distributes them. If there are many attributes withdrawn from attribute
universe, the similar proceeding can also do. When there are new attributes
added to attribute universe U , attribute authorities who monitor these attributes also need to renew their sharing and to distribute the attribute
private keys as the above step after CA veriﬁes the validation of these attributes. Renewing the sharing makes the scheme ensure both backward
security and forward security.
– The number of authorities in the system can be changed because of the
joining or withdrawing of authorities: it is possible to allow the central authority to add additional attribute authorities to the system at any point
or to cancel the right of attribute authorities. CA can run system update
only by computing new sharing of u, and the rest of attribute authorities
also needn’t renew their public keys and private keys. They only renew the
sharing and generate new attribute private keys to realize update.
3.4

Security Analysis

In our system, each authority chooses his own public key and secret key pairs
respectively, so even if the adversary corrupts almost all of the authorities, he
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cannot obtain any information about other authorities without being corrupted.
In the following security analysis, we adopt a weaker model in which the adversary can get any attribute private keys, even if the challenge attributes, but we
don’t present him the master secret keys of the corrupted authorities. We prove
its security under an “interactive” version of the of LWE hardness assumption
in the presence of a signing oracle for the (stateful) “Hash-and-Sign” Digital
Signature Schemes in random oracle model. A similar “interactive” assumption
about the hardness of “interactive quadratic residuosity assumption” was used
for the IBE [Gentry et al. 08, Boneh et al. 07].
Theorem 1. Let A be a PPT adversary with advantage ε > 0 against the
following selective attributes secure game for the MA-ABE scheme. If A can
query any polynomial signature oracles, assuming that si , (i = 1, 2, . . . , d) is
the size of the challenge attribute set to the ith authority, then there is a PPT
d

algorithm B that decides the LWE problem with advantage ε/( si + 1).
i=1

Proof. Suppose A is a polynomial-time adversary, and he can succeed against
the proposed scheme in the following selective attributes secure game with advantage ε, then we can construct an algorithm B to resolve the decisional version
d

of LWE problem with advantage ε/( si + 1) by using A as a sub-routine ali=1

gorithm.
Setup

– The adversary A sends a list of challenge attribute sets UC = UC1 , . . . , UCd ,
one for each authority, assuming |UCi | = si . Without loss of generality, we
assume that the attributes in UCi , (i = 1, . . . , d) are the ﬁrst si attributes
monitored by authority i.
– B requests a sampling oracle O provided by LWE problem instance, and
d

receives m
si + 1 LWE samples that we denote as
i=1

{(W1 , V1 )}, {(W11 , V11 ), (W12 , V12 ), . . . , (W1m , V1m )}, {(W21 , V21 ), (W22 , V22 ),
. . . , (W2m , V2m )}, . . . , {(W 1
d
i=1

(W m
d

i=1

si

,
si

1
, V
d
i=1

m
V
d

si

), (W 2
d
i=1

si

2
, V
d
i=1

), . . . ,
si

)}.
si

i=1

B chooses hash function H1 : (0, 1)∗ → Zq and H2 : (0, 1)∗ → Zqn , and he
constructs system public key P P as follows:
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– The

d

i=1
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si matrices (Aij , j = 1, 2, . . . , si , i = 1, 2, . . . , d) are chosen from
1
{W 
i

sl +j

2
, W
i

l=1

sl +j

m
, . . ., W
i

l=1

sl +j

}

l=1

of the LWE challenge
1
{(W 
i
l=1

sl +j

1
, V
i
l=1

sl +j

2
), (W 
i
l=1

sl +j

2
, V
i
l=1

sl +j

m
), . . . , (W 
i
l=1

sl +j

m
, V
i

sl +j

)}.

l=1

– The other matrices Aij , j = si + 1, . . . , di are chosen using Ajt99’s lattice
trapdoor generation scheme with a trapdoor Tji .
– The vector u is constructed from the LWE challenge, u = W1 . The system
public key is returned to the adversary A.
Secret Key Queries
B answers each secret key query for attribute set Uq = Uq1 , . . . , Uqd and global
identiﬁer GID as follows:
For GID, B computes index l = H1 (GID) to choose (d − 1)-degree polynomial fl = (fl, 1 , fl, 2 , . . . , fl, n ) such that fl (0) = (fl, 1 (0), fl, 2 (0), . . . , fl, n (0)) =
u = (u1 , u2 , . . . , ud ), and obtains the d sharing u1 , u2 , . . . , ud of u, and
ui = (fl, 1 (i), fl, 2 (i), . . . , fl, n (i)). There are two cases about secret key queries:
Case 1. Set [d] denotes the set of attribute authorities whose attributes

satisfy |Uqi UCi | = |Ii | ≥ ti

– Let Uqi UCi = Ii , |Ii | ≥ ti . Then, note that B has trapdoors for the matrices
corresponding to the set Uqi − Ii .
– Choose {Ui, j , j = 1, 2, . . . , ti − 1} ⊂ Ii . Pick ei, j randomly using algorithm
SampleGaussian. Set
Aij ei, j = ui, j , j = 1, 2, . . . , ti − 1, i ∈ [d] ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , d}.
– Represent the sharing of ui symbolically as ui, j = ui + ai, 1 j + ai, 2 j 2 +
ai, ti −1 j ti −1 , i = 1, . . . , d. Where, ai, 1 , ai, 2 , . . . , ai, ti −1 , i = 1, . . . , d are
vector variables (each is of length n). ui, 1 , ui, 2 , . . . , ui, ti −1 , ui commonly
determine the values for ai, 1 , ai, 2 , . . . , ai, ti −1 , i ∈ [d], which determine all
sharing ui, 1 , ui, 2 , . . . , ui, |Uqi | , i = 1, . . . , d.
– For j = ti , ti + 1, . . . , |Ii |, the trapdoors cannot be known. B deﬁnes
H2 (gi, j ) = ui, j , i ∈ [d]. Query the signature oracle for gi, j (i ∈ [d]) according to the diﬀerent signature oracle machine and returned by ei, j =
fA−1
i (H2 (gi, j )).
j
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– For j = |Ii | + 1, |Ii | + 2, . . . , |Uqi |, B can invoke SamplePre(Aij , Tji , ui, j , i ∈
[d]) to get ei, j satisfying Aij ei, j = ui, j , i ∈ [d].
– Return ei, j , j = 1, 2, . . . , |Uqi |, i ∈ [d].
|Uqi

Case 2. Let [d] denote the set of attribute authorities whose attributes satisfy
 i
UC | = |Ii | < ti .


– Let Uqi UCi = Ii , |Ii | < ti . Then, note that B has trapdoors for the matrices
corresponding to the set Uqi − Ii .
– For Ui, j ∈ Ii , pick ei, j randomly using algorithm SampleGaussian. Set
Aij ei, j = ui, j , j = 1, . . . , |Ii |, i ∈ [d].
– Represent the sharing of ui symbolically as ui, j = ui + ai, 1 j + ai, 2 j 2 +
ai, ti −1 j ti −1 , i ∈ [d]. Where, ai, 1 , ai, 2 , . . . , ai, ti −1 , i ∈ [d] are vector variables and each is of length n.
– Since |Ii | < ti , and there are ti − 1 variables ai, 1 , ai, 2 , . . . , ai, ti −1 , i ∈ [d]
by choosing ti − 1 − |Ii | sharing ui, si +2 , ui, si +3 , . . . , ui, ti randomly, the
values for ai, 1 , ai, 2 , . . . , ai, ti −1 , i ∈ [d] are determined. This determines all
sharing ui, 1 , ui, 2 , . . . , ui, |Uiq | , i ∈ [d]. For j = |Ii | + 1, |Ii | + 2, . . . , |Uiq |, and
B can invoke SamplePre(Aij , Tji , ui, j , i ∈ [d]) to get ei, j satisfying Aij ei, j =
ui, j , i ∈ [d].
– Return ei, j , j = 1, 2, . . . , |Uiq |, i ∈ [d].
Remark. The adversary can make as many secret key queries as he wants to
the honest attribute authorities. The only requirements are that for each GID,
there must be at least one honest authority K from which the adversary requests
fewer than tK of the attributes given in UCK , i.e. the adversary never requests
enough attributes to decrypt the challenge ciphertext.
Challenge
B chooses a bit b, computes the encryption of b for attribute set UC as follows:
d

– Computes D = (d!l!)2 , where l = max{dK }.
K=1

– Let
c0 ← DV1 + b q/2
and
ci = (DVi1 , DVi2 , . . . . DVim ), i = 1, 2, . . . ,

d

i=1

si .
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– Outputs ciphertext CT = (c0 , {ci }, i = 1, 2, . . . ,
phertext to the adversary.

d
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si ), and sends this ci-

i=1

More Secret Key Queries
The adversary may make more secret key queries subjecting to the requirements described above.
Guess
When the adversary A outputs a guess b∗ , the simulator B uses that guess
to determine an answer on the LWE oracle: Output “genuine”, if b = b∗ , else
output “random”.

4

MA-ABE Scheme from Lattices with Constant Size

In the above scheme, the size of system public keys is proportional to the total
number of attributes in the system, and the size of the ciphertext is proportional
to the total number of attributes in the ciphertext. All these cause low eﬃciency
when there is a large attribute universe. In this section, we give a multi-authority
large universe ABE scheme. In the following scheme, the sizes of the public key
and the ciphertext are only relative to the number of the attribute authorities.
A user will be able to decrypt a ciphertext if and only if he has at least tK of
the attributes from each authority K.
4.1

Concrete Protocol

Assuming there are d authorities, and each authority K can authenticate dK
attributes. There is a central authority CA that any authority can act as. Let λ be
a security parameter. Let q = q(λ), p = p(λ) be two primes, n = n(λ), m = m(λ)
be two positive integers, and σ = σ(λ), α = α(λ) be two positive Gaussian
parameters. tK is the number that a user can only decrypt if he has at least tK
of the given attributes from each authority K. Let [dK ] ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , dK }, and
|[dK ]| ≥ tK . Deﬁne the universe U of attributes. For simplicity, we can take the
ﬁrst |U | elements of Zp , to be the universe. Namely, the integers 1, 2, . . . , |U |.
SetUp. Given a security parameter λ and n, m, σ, α, q as input, each authority K runs Ajt99’s lattice trapdoor generation algorithm to get mpkK =
AK ∈ Zqn×m , mskK = TK ∈ Λ⊥
q (AK ) as master public key and master secret key of authority K. Each authority randomly chooses a vector
uK ∈ Zqn , and CA computes random vector u ∈ Zqn = u1 + u2 + . . . +
uK (mod q) = (u1 , u2 , . . . , un ). CA chooses a family of (d − 1)-degree polynomial sets F = {fi = (fi1 , fi2 , . . . , fin ) : {0, 1}l → Zqn } such that ∀i, fi1 (0) =
u1 , fi2 (0) = u2 , . . . , fin (0) = un . Deﬁne the system master public key as
M P K = mpk1 , mpk2 , . . . , mpkd , u, F .
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Attribute Key Generation. Given a global identiﬁer GID and attribute
1
2
d
, UGID
. . . UGID
, the central authority CA computes j =
set UGID = UGID
H(GID) and uses it as index to choose (d − 1)-degree polynomial fj from the
family of (d − 1)-degree polynomials F = {fn : {0, 1}l → Zqn }. CA computers d sharing of u to d authorities. Namely, he sets (ur, 1 , ur, 2 , . . . , ur, d ) =
(fjr (1), fjr (2), . . . , fjr (d)) as sharing of ur for r = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each authority
K gets his sharing uK = (u1, K , u2, K , . . . , un, K ) and divides it into dK sharing (uK1 , uK2 , . . . , uKdK ) by using (tK , dK ) Shamir secret sharing scheme on
every coordinate of uK , K = 1, . . . , d. Each authority K runs the algorithm
K
, ∀K, and sends
SamplePre, and ﬁnds eKi such that AK eKi = uKi , i ∈ UGID
K
eKi , i ∈ UGID
, K = 1, . . . , d, to user with global identiﬁer GID. The private
key is SKID = (eKi )i∈UGID
K
, K = 1, . . . , d.
Encrypt. Given system public key M P K and a message b ∈ {0, 1}:
d

– Let D = (d!l!)2 , where l = max dK , choose a uniformly random s ← Zqn , a
K=1

noise term x ← χα, q and xi ← χm
α, q , i = 1, . . . , d.
– Compute
c0 ← uT s + Dx + b q/2 ∈ Zq , ci ← ATi s + Dxi ∈ Zqm (mod q), i = 1, . . . , d.
– Output ciphertext CT = (c0 , {ci }, i = 1, . . . , d).
Decrypt. Given system public key M P K, the private key SKGID , and a
K
| ≥ tK , ∀K, then the entity does:
ciphertext CT . If |UGID
– Computes Lagrangian coeﬃcients Li, j , Li so that


Li, j Ai eij =

ui

(mod q),

j∈[dK ]

d


Li ui = u (mod q).

i=1

– Computes
b  ← c0 −

d

i=1

Li



Li, j eTij ci (mod q).

j∈[dK ]

– Outputs 0 if b is closer to 0 than to q/2 (mod q), otherwise outputs 1.
4.2

Security Analysis

Theorem 2. Assuming A is a PPT adversary with non-negligible advantage
ε > 0 that succeeds against the large universe MA-ABE scheme in the following
selective attributes secure game. If A can query any polynomial signature oracles,
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assuming that si , (i = 1, 2, . . . , d) is the size of the challenge attribute set to
the ith authority, then there exists a PPT algorithm B that decides the LWE
d

problem with advantage ε/( si + 1).
i=1

Proof. It is similar to the proof of scheme in Section 3, and thus we omit it
here.

5

Conclusions and Future Work

In this paper, we present the ﬁrst MA-ABE scheme from lattices. Similar to
Chase’s scheme, there is a central authority in our scheme, but the central authority in our scheme cannot generate any attribute private key, which really
avoids the key escrow problem without adding any burden. Furthermore, diﬀerent users’ attribute private keys cannot be combined to give correct decryption,
which avoids the collusion threat of diﬀerent users. Finally, we give a MA-ABE
scheme under large universe of attributes, in which the sizes of the public key
and the ciphertext are only relative to the number of the attribute authorities.
MA-ABE schemes from lattices without central authority are more diﬃcult to
design, and this is our future work direction.
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